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International Narcotics Developments

State Department review completed

DOJ Review Completed.

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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS DEVELOPMENTS


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This publication is prepared by analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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			of Impure	Morphine	
Base Pr	coduction	and Trade			

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ities located on the Burma-Thailand border that normally produce heroin have also shifted to converting raw opium into impure morphine base. This is apparently an effort to reduce the bulkiness of their narcotics inventories and facilitate storage.

Six of the privately owned refineries in the northern Shan State are located in areas under the control of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The KIA protects these facilities and in return collects taxes on their operations. A considerable portion of the base produced in these refineries has been purchased by the Shan United Army (SUA) and placed in storage in the northern Shan State. The SUA has been the only organization purchasing bulk quantities of impure morphine base since the end of February. Previously, most private traffickers attempted to market their base in the Lashio area with very limited success and at low prices.

Despite large-scale purchases by the SUA since February, the bulk of the impure morphine base shipments to the Thai border has been transported by private traffickers. During the first six months of 1977, a little over 4 tons of impure morphine base was shipped out of the northern Shan State compared to 3 tons for the same period of 1976. April 1977 was the high point for these shipments when some 3 tons departed from the north.

A large part of the impure morphine base reaching the Burma-Thailand border is believed to have gone into storage. As of the beginning of April at least 1.5 tons was reported to be in storage of which about one ton was under control of the SUA.

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The increased emphasis on the production and trade in impure morphine base probably results from the desire by traffickers, particularly the SUA, to reduce the risk of interdiction by the Burmese army. Conversion of raw opium into impure morphine base reduces the bulk and allows the use of porters, the currently preferred method of transporting.

The SUA caches of impure morphine base were a major target of the recent Mohein III operation conducted by the Burmese army. It garnered only insignificant quantities of morphine base, apparently because these stocks were transferred to the Thai side of the border and concealed in new locations.

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COLOMBIA: Strengthening Narcotics Control Efforts

Relations between Washington and Bogota appear to have been strengthened—at least with regard to joint drug control efforts—as a result of last month's meeting between First Lady Rosalynn Carter and President Lopez. Since then, Lopez has met with other US envoys and drug experts to discuss the narcotics problem in Colombia. A number of positive developments have already begun to unfold.

At Lopez' urging, the US has agreed to give the Colombians \$3.7 million worth of equipment, including three helicopters, to try to curb the flow of cocaine and other drugs to North America. Lopez also has agreed to a meeting this week with high-level officials from Washington to discuss the sensitive issue of drug-related corruption in his government.


The emphasis in all of the narcotics dialogues has centered primarily on the cocaine problem. However, in the wake of recent widespread media coverage in Colombia on the extensive cultivation of marijuana in the Guajira region, Lopez has specifically requested US technical assistance for a herbicide spray eradication program similar to the one currently under way in Mexico.

Colombian police officials estimate that as many as 30,000 hectares of marijuana may be under cultivation. Preliminary reports from a US drug control expert indicate that 90 percent of the crop would be susceptible to aerial spraying without danger to humans or legitimate agricultural crops. A pioneer in aerial spraying, Colombia has the necessary equipment, chemicals, and personnel to launch its own eradication campaign. It is likely, however, that the initial request for technical assistance from the US will be followed by a request for financial and material support as well.

Although marijuana eradication has a low priority for the US, it is a major concern to the government of PS SNIN 77-015
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
COLOMBIA: Major Drug Producing Areas



Colombia in terms of domestic abuse, political embarrassment, and as a major contributing factor to the lawlessness of the Guajira region. In view of the growing evidence of opium cultivation in Colombia, there is a possibility that at some later date the US may find it desirable to encourage the Colombians to initiate aerial spraying against the poppy fields and even coca bushes elsewhere.

While coca is not grown extensively in Colombia, local traffickers might be constrained to increase cultivationparticularly if crop substitution programs and more stringent enforcement measures in Peru and Bolivia result in a reduction of coca leaves.	25
An eradication cam-	
paign in Colombia against marijuana would not only set a precedent, but also allay suspicions and fears of both official and public sectors about possible deleterious effects of a larger scale herbicide spray program.	25X6

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NETHERLANDS: Fighting the Drug Traffic

Dutch police believe their efforts to control the domestic heroin trade are paying off. The campaign has included strengthened drug squads, record drug seizures by police and customs officials, and tougher penalties for trafficking. According to Amsterdam Police Commissioner Toorenaar, however, the single biggest factor in shutting down the heroin flow has been a program to deport illegal Chinese residents.

The legal Chinese community in Amsterdam numbers less than 2,000 people; by November 1976, there were also 10,000 illegal Chinese, many of them involved in narcotics smuggling from Asia. Since the police crackdown began in November the number of illegals has dwindled to about 1,000. At the same time, the price of a gram of Chinese heroin--"brown sugar"--rose markedly, a sure indication that supplies were being cut off. The Dutch also intend to cooperate with other European narcotics officers to ensure that the deported Chinese do not turn up elsewhere on the continent.

Although the Dutch have shied away from directly committing money to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), they have joined the international fight to reduce drug supplies. In June, the Dutch government announced the financing of a research project at the International Trade Center aimed at finding markets for agricultural products coming from UNFDAC's crop replacement programs, particularly those in Thailand. Development Cooperation Minister Pronk also said he intended to give money through the UN Development Program to projects that include crop replacement in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

(Editor's Note: These items, produced for other CIA publications, do not deal specifically with international narcotics. They are included, however, because they concern developing situations that could impact adversely on the international narcotics control effort.)

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PAKISTAN: Prospects for Elections

Pakistan's new military government has stated repeatedly that it will hold elections in early October and that it will surrender power to civilians soon thereafter. The process, however, may prove considerably more difficult than the generals expected when they seized power two weeks ago. Chief Martial Law Administrator Zia-ul-Haq said in a press conference last week that the law and order situation would have to be "perfect" to hold a fair election. The military has already taken steps to limit expected campaign violence. The campaign will be relatively short, some activities such as processions will be banned, and the military is trying to collect weapons from potential demonstrators. Whether the campaign is violent enough to force cancellation of the election will depend more on the politicians than on precautions the military takes.

There has been speculation that former Prime Minister Bhutto--whose followers could create widespread turmoil--might seek to prevent the election. One strategy open to Bhutto is to boycott the election and thus to present the military with a choice between cancellation and a meaningless vote. Many Pakistanis believe Bhutto is certain to lose, and he might reason that an extended period of military rule is to his advantage. Bhutto now seems prepared, however, to contest the election--with "imperialists and reactionaries" two of his main targets. The US, which he has accused of interfering in Pakistani politics, could well be one scapegoat.

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With the military coup, the opposition Pakistan National Alliance gained its original demands for Bhutto's removal and a new election. The alliance, however, is suspicious of Zia, who was generally regarded as Bhutto's man and who has made some public statements since the military takeover that could be interpreted as favoring Bhutto. Speculation that the coup was actually ordered by Bhutto is probably baseless. Even if Bhutto and Zia were acting together, pressure on Zia from other senior officers would probably prevent him from carrying out his part of the deal.

The opposition will regard Zia's willingness to carry out several promises as indications of his sincerity. Zia promised to withdraw troops now fighting proposition tribes in Baluchistan province. Bhutto's party swept this opposition stronghold in the last election after the opposition boycotted it asserting that a fair election there was impossible. Zia, however, qualified his promise, saying that the withdrawal should not be so precipitous as to create a vacuum. The military might move too slowly to satisfy the Alliance.

Zia also promised soon to release leading politicians from both sides who are still in custody. He may, however, try to delay as long as he can in hopes of postponing the unofficial opening of the election campaign. Some opposition leaders are unhappy with Zia's decision not to release Khan Abdul Wali Khan, a leading opposition figure who was jailed in 1975 on charges of plotting the secession of the two provinces along the Afghan border. Zia has announced that the Federal Security Force will be reorganized, but the opposition will want major changes in this paramilitary organization generally regarded as loyal to Bhutto--if not its disbanding. has also appointed a respected judge as chief election commissioner. The opposition will judge the commission more by the other members -- not yet named -- and the exact powers given the commission.

Even if the military does hold an election, the results may give it second thoughts about handing over power. An Alliance victory would threaten to give control of the two frontier provinces to politicians whom many in the military regard as separatists. A close

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race, or a surfacing of the deep differences among the nine parties in an Alliance government, would threaten instability. A victory by Bhutto would raise charges of collusion between Bhutto and the army, and the Alliance might take to the streets again.

At this stage, the military seems determined to hand over power, and no senior officer now seems to have any desire to perpetuate military rule. Despite the difficulties it could face, the military will probably make every effort to establish civilian rule, even if both the election and the new government have serious flaws. It is possible, however, that by October the military might conclude that either the election or the subsequent transfer of power will have to be delayed.

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General Kriangsak of Thailand: Rising Star or Burning Meteor

General Kriangsak Chamanan, deputy supreme commander of the Thai armed forces, has emerged as one of the key figures in the military-civilian group now governing Thailand, and there are signs that he harbors ambitions for even greater political power. But it is questionable whether he has enough support within the politically factionalized Thai army to become the strongman the army appears to be seeking.

Since the death in April 1976 of General Krit Siwara, the Thai military strongman and former acting supreme commander of the armed forces, the Thai military has lacked a dominant personality. Krit had the support of politicians, businessmen, and the military. He exerted considerable behind-the-scenes influence on military and political affairs and was the only soldier with enough prestige to have had any real chance of planning and executing a military takeover. His control of the army

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and commitment to the civilian government, moreover, protected Thailand's democratic "experiment." Krit's death inaugurated a period of instability within the armed forces marked by factional maneuvering on the part of several key leaders.

Although the pre-emptive coup of October 1976 by the armed service chiefs demonstrated some unity at the senior command level of the military, the members of the military council, which was established to guide and control the civilian government, almost immediately began jockeying for influence. Moreover, those right-wing elements frozen out of power by the October coup have since been plotting from the sidelines; on March 26 General Chalat Hiranyasiri attempted to seize the government. This effort was foiled when only a small fraction of the military would support him.

Continuing unhappiness within the middle ranks of the military led to the unprecedented, but unsuccessful, attempt by several junior officers in early June to pressure army Commander in Chief General Soem Na Nakhon into forcing Prime Minister Thanin to make changes in his cabinet. The army would like to replace Thanin, who has proven too rigidly doctrinaire for their taste; at a minimum, they are determined to force out some of his ministers.

Within the unsettled atmosphere of military infighting, aggravated by a glaring lack of both military and civilian leadership, it is natural for everyone to be looking for an individual with the charisma or a network of loyalties to pull it all together. Is Kriangsak the one?

Kriangsak was one of the central figures in both defusing the March 1977 coup attempt and the events of early June. As secretary general and perhaps the most intelligent and dynamic member of the Prime Minister's Advisory Council (PMAC)—the principal instrument through which the Thai military supervises and controls the Thanin cabinet—Kriangsak's views on most issues are likely to prevail.

Kriangsak's power and influence have been growing since October 1976, and that he may now see himself as prime

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ministerial timber. It is not clear how he proposes to realize this ambition, if indeed it is a serious goal. Kriangsak is likely to be appointed supreme commander of the armed forces on September 30, 1977 and is not scheduled to retire until September 30, 1979. Should he desire to retain power after 1979, he would have to develop a strong independent power base from which he could barter for an influential position in the government.

Kriangsak has actively supported Thanin during the eight months he has held office, arguing for patience in the face of growing army hostility, but in recent weeks he has grown outspokenly critical of the Prime Minister. The eroding support for Thanin within the military and among the public, combined with Kriangsak's newly apparent dissatisfaction with the Prime Minister, argues for some rearranging of the government in the near future. The King's continuing support of Thanin, however, is a major obstacle to any effort to remove him.

Kriangsak would have difficulty gaining the premiership or even a role in Thai politics equal to Krit's. First, he does not have the broad military support essential to a successful bid for power, nor does he have any troops under his direct control. Military coup leaders have traditionally come out of the army's First Division--the Bangkok garrison. A coup attempt without the support of the Bangkok commanders is not likely to succeed, as General Chalat discovered. order to organize a coup attempt, Kriangsak would have to form an alliance with one or more of the Bangkok area commanders. Second, he is not as popular as Krit was within the military. Kriangsak would have to overcome the distaste of many important army officers, whose animosity would probably grow as his power increased. Finally, the King, whose backing is now virtually essential for anyone making a bid for power, is reportedly not inclined to support an abrogation of the current Thai political system and a return to direct military rule.

These factors will confront Kriangsak should he make a bid for greater and extended power in Thailand. None is insurmountable, but each poses problems and may, at a minimum, cause his consolidation of power to be spread out over a lengthy period of time.

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North Korea: A Review of Its Connections With Terrorist, Subversive, and Insurgent Movements

North Korea hit the headlines and acquired its public reputation as a patron of terrorism and subversion in 1970 and 1971.

- --In March 1970, nine Japan Red Army (JRA) members hijacked a JAL aircraft with the express intent of going to North Korea. Pyongyang gave the nine asylum and retained the YS-ll craft.
- --In March 1971, Mexico revealed that it had uncovered a subversive group, the Revolutionary Action Movement (MAR), whose members had been trained in and received financial backing from North Korea. When the MAR was broken up, it was apparently about to embark on a program of synchronized terrorism.
- --In April 1971, Sri Lanka expelled the North Korean embassy and suspended diplomatic relations in response to government suspicions that Pyongyang was helping fund a then-current insurgency. Some reports claimed that North Korea had obtained the funds through its local black-market operations.

While Pyongyang neither invited nor welcomed the JRA hijacking, the developments in Ceylon and Mexico grew out of established government policies. By 1968, North Korea was inviting foreign groups and individuals to receive guerrilla warfare training in Korea and was directing its missions in the free world to maintain contacts with local underground movements. The training program and the cultivation of contacts among subversives and terrorists continue today, although North Korea has been more cautious in recent years, seeking where possible to avoid actions that might threaten state-to-state relations.

The Motivations

There is no record--either public or private--that Pyongyang applauds or intentionally supports the acts of

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transnational terrorism executed by such groups as the JRA or the fedayeen. Yet North Korea offers material aid to these groups, as well as to a host of other groups and individuals that are inclined to use violence. In general, this willingness to deal with terrorists, subversives, and insurgents reflects the desire of a communist state to prove its revolutionary credentials.

There are other motivations as well.

- --Expertise in commando and guerrilla training is one of the few salable commodities or services that North Korea has. The training of terrorists, particularly on the scale conducted in Korea itself, serves as a form of material foreign aid and may also be a currency earner for Pyongyang.
- --Contacts with terrorists and subversives are a natural by-product of North Korean efforts to strengthen party-to-party relations with communist movements abroad. This is particularly applicable in areas, such as Latin America, where communist parties are not legitimate.
- --Dealings with underground groups intertwine with North Korea's wide-scale blackmarketing and drug trafficking abroad, a practice that appears designed primarily to finance diplomatic operations overseas.
- --Many subversives supply North Korea with desired support--especially in the formation of friend-ship societies and the publication of propaganda-for furthering Pyongyang's political objectives abroad.
- --Pyongyang may believe that its contacts with the JRA will eventually prove useful in its own campaign of subversion against South Korea. Pyongyang has been willing to employ tactics of terror against Seoul, but North Korea views these acts as a domestic matter quite removed from international terrorism.

Record of Contacts

North Korea's most extensive dealings with a terrorist group have been with the Popular Front for the Liberation

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of Palestine (PFLP). This group apparently first attempted to secure military and financial assistance in 1969, but it was not until September 1970, when George Habbash visited North Korea, that Pyongyang agreed to ar aid program.	25X1 25X1
In the Persian Gulf area, North Korea in the early 1970s apparently supplied small quantities of weapons and foodstuffs to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, a South Yemeni supported insurgency group active in the Dhofar region of Oman until December 1975. A smanumber of Dhofari rebels may have received training in Korea. Korean involvement with the Somali-sponsored insurgency against the Ogaden region of Ethiopia grew out of a July 1970 visit to Pyongyang by Vice President Abokar.	.11
Dealings with Latin American extremists have covere both personnel operating in their home countries and others living in exile. In a number of cases, Cubawit which North Korea has close working relationshas facil itated the contact. Among the groups that are reported	h

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to have received training in Korea are the communist parties of the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Guatemala, the National Liberation Army (ELN) of Colombia, and the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Nucleus (MLRN) --an exile group based in Europe. As of mid-1976, North Korea was using its trade mission in Lima for contacts with the Peruvian Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). Buenos Aires suspected, but was unable to develop hard evidence, that North Korea was using its embassy to materially aid local guerrillas. These suspicions contributed to the Argentinian decision to break relations with Pyongyang in June.

North Korean relations with the JRA are a subject of particular confusion; the scope of contacts is often exaggerated. There is, for example, no basis for occasional press reports that Pyongyang offered asylum in three major acts of JRA terrorism. It only gave asylum in the case of the March 1970 hijacking from Japan.* Eight of the nine hijackers were still in North Korea as of late 1976,** but there is no good information linking their presence there to recent Korean dealings with the JRA. Pyongyang's major contacts appear to be handled via meetings between activist Taketomo Takahashi and Yi Chol-ho, second secretary at the North Korean embassy in East Berlin.

Nondirective Support

Although reports of North Korean intent to target the JRA or other terrorists against South Korea surface

^{*}In January-February 1974, during the prolonged seizure of a Shell Oil refinery in Singapore by two Japanese and two Arabs, the terrorists requested safe haven at the local North Korean consulate. The incident ended abruptly, however, before a response from Pyongyang was received. North Korea played no role-during or after-the JRA's seizure of the French embassy in The Hague in September 1974.

^{**}The whereabouts of the group leader, Takamaro Tamiya, cannot be confirmed. There are several reports citing his alleged presence in Europe.

with nearly predictable regularity, evidence does not exist to support a view that Pyongyang can direct the activities of any of the extremists to whom it offers material aid and training. In fact, this lack of directive support is the most outstanding characteristic of North Korea's performance as a patron state of international terrorism. Pyongyang does rely on the use of subversion and terrorism to advance its reunification scenario vis-a-vis South Korea, but in these endeavors it uses its own citizens or members of the pro - North Korean Chosen Soren (Federation of Koreans Resident in Japan).

North Korean support to terrorists and subversives abroad is an integral part of government policy on foreign relations, but Pyongyang does not essentially view international terrorist activity as a useful tool for advancing its key policy interests.

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TURKEY: New Coalition Government

Turkish Prime Minister - designate Demirel has apparently reached agreement with two small right-wing parties to reassemble the "nationalist front" government that held power prior to the country's recent parliamentary election. In a press statement July 19, Demirel, leader of the Justice Party, implied that the coalition parties have apportioned ministerial portfolios and that only the relatively straightforward matter of matching names and positions remained to be addressed. He said he hoped to present a cabinet list to President Koruturk July 20.

If events flow as smoothly as Demirel hopes, Turkey could have a government by the end of the month. Despite his dislike of National Salvation Party leader Erbakan, who will be part of the coalition, Koruturk would have little reason not to approve Demirel's cabinet, because the three parties in the coalition control a majority of seats in the lower house. After receiving presidential

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approval, the government would then have a week to publish its program, and parliamentary debate and a vote of confidence would ensue.

Turkey's closely divided electorate will not greet the announcement of a Demirel government enthusiastically. Many in Turkey have reservations about the country being governed again by a coalition that during more than two and a half years in power proved largely incapable of focusing on the country's many problems.

The leader of Turkey's largest labor confederation said last week that if the Demirel government won a vote of confidence he would lead a general strike until it fell. There are other indications that the left is already chafing at the prospect of several more years of rightist rule.

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BRIEFS

THAILAND: Thai Narcotics Suppression Police on July 14 arrested a major narcotics trafficker and in a related raid seized over 140 kilograms of heroin and morphine. A Thai police official described the drug seizure as the biggest ever made in Thailand. The man arrested is described as one of the top traffickers in Thailand and reportedly was involved in an international drug ring for over 10 years. This arrest and seizure is another indication of the seriousness with which the Thai government is attacking the drug problem.
THAILAND: Next month Thai authorities will burn 284 kilograms (625 pounds) of heroin seized in drug
trafficking cases during recent years. According to a Thai official the heroin was confiscated dur-
ing 1973 and 1974. Other seizures are still under investigation and will be destroyed later. A ton
of morphine base is being held for possible sale to pharmaceutical companies.

TURKEY: The opium poppy straw harvest is continuing on schedule with continuing indications of a bumper crop. In some areas, storage space is already becoming a problem. In one growing area there are reports that the poppy capsules are smaller than usual and are turning black. Too much fertilizer and too little rain may have been the cause of these unexpected phenomena. The possible effect on the morphine content of the poppies is under study, but as yet there is no indication of serious concern. The extent of the problem is not known.

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ECUADOR: Earlier this year the passage of a Supreme Decree law constituted a major breakthrough on the destruction of seized drugs in Ecuador. According to the new law, only a small sample of confiscated drugs is to be held for the courts, while the rest is tagged for immediate destruction. This was one of the US' objectives in the 1977 narcotics assistance program for Ecuador. Previously there had been numerous instances in which confiscated drugs were resold by corrupt officials. Apparently, however, the various Ecuadorean enforcement components charged with drug control have complied with the governmental decree in every case since its promulgation.

NORWAY: The government of Norway has given \$5.4 million from its Development Aid Funds to the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) to help reduce illicit opium production in Burma. The funds will be used to help finance the UN's crop substitution program in Burma over the next five years. Apart from the US contributions, this is the largest single pledge to the Fund since its inception in 1971, and is viewed by US representatives in Geneva as a significant breakthrough in UNFDAC efforts to solicit contributions for the Fund. The \$6.5 million UN pilot program in Burma includes plans to get Burmese farmers to replace opium cultivation with other crops and animal breeding.

ITALY: Police at Rome's Leonardo da Vinci International Airport recently confiscated 1,433 pounds of hashish, worth more than \$2 million, aboard a Pakistani jetliner. The plane had arrived from Karachi with a stopover in Damascus, and the drugs were discovered during a routine check of the plane by police "sniffer" dogs. The "hash" was found hidden in 10 cases which purportedly contained souvenirs bound for Sweden.

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INTERESTING READING

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- Police Seize Two Cocaine Laboratories, Break Up Gang (CHILE) -- TNDD, No. 308, pp. 17-18.
- More on "World's Largest" Marijuana Plantation (COLOMBIA) -- TNDD, No. 308, pp. 21-25.
- Tapia: Priavte, Public Corruption Encourages Drugs (MEX-ICO) -- TNDD, No. 308, pp. 34-35.
- Amsterdam Faces Increase in Drug-Induced Crimes (NETHER-LANDS) -- TNDD, No. 308, pp. 51-54.
- Effects of Drug Addiction Recounted (BRAZIL) -- TNDD, No. 309, July 8, 1977, pp. 24-30.
- Marijuana, Weapons, Traffickers Seized in Sonora (MEXICO) -- TNDD, No. 309, pp. 45-46.
- Seizures of Heroin, Opium, Hashish in 1976 Reported (IRAN) -- TNDD, No. 309, pp. 58-60.
- Heroin Smuggling Ring Smashed in Sydney (AUSTRALIA) -- TNDD, No. 310, July 14, 1977, p. 2.
- Japanese Police To Launch Massive Antidrug Drive in July (JAPAN) -- TNDD, No. 310, p. 16.
- Seizure of Marijuana, Weapons in Maranhao (BRAZIL) -- TNDD, No. 310, pp. 43-44.

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- Poor Prosecution Record Against Traffickers Probed (COLOM-BIA) -- TNDD, No. 310, pp. 46-49.
- Furniture Factory Fronts for Traffickers (COLOMBIA) -- TNDD, No. 310, pp. 50-53.
- Drug Addiction Is 8.3 Percent Among Youths (COLOMBIA) -- TNDD, No. 310, pp. 71-73.
- Cuzco Invaded by "Hippies" (PERU) -- TNDD, No. 310, pp.89-96. (Colonies in the Sacred Valley become a "drug paradise.")

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